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In recent years a debate has been going on both in the narrow 
confines of legal scholarship and in the press concerning constitu-
tional protection of private property. Newspapers regularly include 
articles, columns, and editorials about government agencies that 
have extended their regulatory power over some resource--whether 
wetlands, landmark buildings, or rental apartments-and many 
property owners are outraged at what they view as a gross intrusion 
on their private domain. The intrusion seems all the worse to these 
property owners and their supporters because the government's ac-
tion with respect to their things is more than an inconvenient bu-
reaucratic requirement like mandatory recycling. It is rather a 
substantial usurpation of their ownership rights that is unaccompa-
nied by any compensation. In legal argot, it is a "taking" of prop-
erty that masquerades as mere "regulation." 
To make matters worse, American courts, including (or per-
haps one should say especially) the United States Supreme Court, 
have been confused and confusing in their attempts to define the 
scope of legal protection for property under the takings clauses of 
the federal and state's constitutions. The Supreme Court has ap-
plied various tests for determining when a regulation "goes too far," 
as Justice Holmes put it, t and becomes a taking of property. There 
seems to be little rhyme or reason to the application of these tests, 
and their collective effect throughout most of this century has been 
to leave government regulators pretty much unconstrained, at least 
by the takings clause. More recently, however, the Court appears 
to have taken a new tack, which might reinvigorate the takings 
clause as a check on government intervention with the rights of pri-
vate ownership of property. But the significance of these latest tak-
ings decisions has been the subject of almost as much disagreement 
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as was focused on the underlying question of the appropriate scope 
of government regulation of property rights. 
In this brief paper I want to describe a way of understanding 
the current takings scene. Many people believe that there is a single 
traditional understanding of what property is and why it is pro-
tected in our constitutional scheme. This view is commonly attrib-
uted to those on the political Right, but some commentators on the 
Left have also accepted it, usually as a prelude to attacking the cen-
tral position that property occupied in the Founders' vision, partic-
ularly that of James Madison.2 On both ends of the political 
spectrum, these commentators believe that the takings clause has 
always been understood according to what I will call the self-
regarding vision of property. According to this vision, the crucial 
fact of political and social life in our political and legal culture is 
that each person is free to do or say pretty much what he wants, 
within certain obvious limits. The purpose of property and its con-
stitutional protection, then, is nothing more or less than to create a 
wall between the individual and the collective that will guarantee 
the individual the space, literally as well as figuratively, to satisfy 
his own desires. 
I will argue that this picture is radically incomplete. There is 
in fact a second, competing, vision of the role of property that is 
present in our political and legal discourse. I will call this alterna-
tive vision "communitarian."3 An equally apt label, one that em-
phasizes its historical and current connection with the civic 
republican tradition, is "civic." This vision is not, however, strictly 
republican, for it includes an important element that is not uniquely 
republican. That element is best expressed by the term "responsi-
bility." The self-regarding vision defines the role of property exclu-
sively in terms of strong individual rights or individual 
2. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutional-
ism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (U. of Chi. Press, 1990) ("Private Property"). 
Professor Nedelsky's book states an interpretation of American constitutionalism that resem-
bles in certain respects Louis Hartz's thesis that the United States has had a single, continu-
ous political tradition since its founding. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 
(Harcourt, Brace, 1955). That tradition is Lockean liberalism. One of its aspects was a con-
ception of property, usually associated with Locke's name, that C.B. Macpherson called 
"possessive individualism." C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individual-
ism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford U. Press, 1962). Like Hartz, Nedelsky sees just one dominant 
understanding of politics and property in American history, at least since 1789. She associ-
ates that tradition with the name of James Madison, rather than John Locke. 
3. In calling this an alternative vision, I do not mean to reduce the dialectic to the 
stark contrast that is sometimes drawn between "liberalism" and "communitarianism." That 
contrast is simplistic and misleading. Both visions that I describe here can be considered 
liberal; they reflect what Nancy Rosenblum has aptly called the "two faces" of liberalism. 
See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction, in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the 
Moral Life I, 5 (Harv. U. Press, 1989). 
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expectations. It has nothing to say about the individual property 
owner's responsibility as a member of the community. The commu-
nitarian vision, by contrast, emphasizes the individual property 
owner's sense of responsibility to his community for the use of his 
property as central to the owner's fully realizing his individual 
freedom.4 
The effect of recognizing the communitarian vision will be to 
deny that there is a single privileged understanding, conceptual or 
historical,s of why or when property is or should be constitutionally 
protected. Neither side in arguments about takings can trump the 
other by appealing to some mythic understanding of property's role 
in our political system. Rather than a single understanding, a dia-
lectic between two competing understandings has shaped the tak-
ings clause. 6 
I call this dialectic "post-modem" because the present stage of 
legal discourse about property postdates the era when legal dis-
course exhibited a widely-shared understanding that property had a 
single meaning or purpose. Legal discourse during that era, the era 
of legal modernity, in fact was also dialectical, but the dialectic was 
not dominantly articulated in terms of a conflict between two con-
tradictory core purposes of property. Post-modernity, which I want 
to distinguish from post-modernism, is the legal culture that we 
now inhabit. In post-modem legal culture--our culture-legal dis-
course no longer can plausibly assume a common, unified political 
theory of property rights or indeed assume that property rights do 
4. For lucid discussions of takings issues from a communitarian perspective, see Mary 
Ann Glendon, "Absolute" Rights: Property and Privacy, in I The Responsive Community 12 
(Fall 1991) and Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 
25-30, 112-14 (Maxwell MacMillan, 1991). For an interesting discussion of water law from a 
communitarian perspective, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern 
Property Law, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1529 (1989). 
As Professor Glendon's work indicates, the thesis that individual owners owe responsi-
bilities to their communities merely by virtue of their relationships with those communities is 
not the exclusive property of the radical Left. For a similar expression of the communitarian 
theme by another distinguished centrist property scholar, see John Edward Cribbet, Concepts 
in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. I, 6, 40. 
5. For a discussion of legal discourse's ambivalence about the role of property during 
one stage of our past, the civic republican period, see Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Prop-
erty in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273 (1991). 
6. In an earlier essay, I argued that conflicting views over the Supreme Court's recent 
takings cases were best understood as a dialectic between two visions of government, the 
public-choice theory and the republican theory. See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings. Narra-
tives. and Power, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1752 (1988). Carol Rose and Frank Michelman have 
developed similar dialectical interpretations of takings jurisprudence generally. See Carol 
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 
( 1984); Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 
Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987). 
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or should have a central role to play in politics. 1 Thus, although 
aspects of both the self-regarding and communitarian visions of 
property were evident in our prior doctrinal practices, the conflict 
between them only recently developed into the overriding predica-
ment occupying legal property discourse as part of a broader cul-
tural movement away from totalizing theories and immutable 
foundations. 
This dialectic is post-modem in another sense as well. Unlike 
classical nineteenth-century dialecticism, the post-modem dialectic 
of takings discourse does not culminate in any grand synthesis. 
Post-modem legal culture is characterized by particularity and per-
spective. There is no neutral ground available to us for reconciling 
in a conclusive sense the two visions. The dialectic will simply con-
tinue. Lest this seem unduly pessimistic, however, I hasten to add 
that while takings disputes will continue to be shaped by this dialec-
tic, these disputes can be and are resolved through the exercise of 
practical judgment, rather than through unvarnished political 
preference. 
Legal discourse about takings has neither been static nor un-
dergone linear transformations. Rather, it has been dialectical. The 
rhetoric of the dialectics has changed over time, but underlying 
these different rhetorical articulations is a continuous predicament, 
which I have elsewhere called the "dialectic of sociality."s This 
predicament concerns the relationship between individuals and the 
communities to which they belong. Conventional takings analysis 
creates ample room for asking what responsibilities government 
regulators owe property owners. But legal discourse, dominated by 
the rhetoric of rights, rarely directly asks another important ques-
tion: What is the extent of the responsibilities that individuals owe 
to their communities, including political communities, as a result of 
their membership? One can glean from legal discussions of takings 
issues, however, two quite different responses to this question. 
One answer, the self-regarding vision, begins by supposing that 
the crucial fact of political and social life is that each person be free 
to do or say what he wants, within certain limits. A person who 
holds this view says, "I don't owe society or the community any-
thing, except to avoid harming others." This type of person views 
himself as a Lone Ranger or, better, Natty Bumppo. The Natty 
Bumppo image is particularly apt because what makes this vision so 
7. For statements that property does not or should not have a significant political role, 
see Nedelsky, Private Property (cited in note 2); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Prop-
erty, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XXII: Property 69 (N.Y.U. 
Press, 1980). 
8. Alexander, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 277 (cited in note 5). 
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compelling is how it is supported by a mythology that is still deeply-
embedded in American thought: the myth of the American as west-
erner-alone, out on the frontier, responsible only for himself, un-
constrained by society or government. This is the central image of 
freedom for many Americans today, despite the fact that it is so 
wildly at odds with the conditions of modern American life. 
Communitarians provide quite a different answer to the ques-
tion. They regard individuals as inextricably enmeshed within both 
various communities and the polity as a whole. Because com-
munitarians understand individuals as fundamentally social,9 they 
believe that improving one's own lot is not the only source of 
human action. Without denying either the fact that humans fre-
quently, indeed usually behave to benefit themselves, or the legiti-
macy of this motive, communitarians believe that social and moral 
commitments to communities constitute another source of human 
action. They reject the view that individuals are primarily responsi-
ble to themselves, and only minimally responsible to the various 
groups in which those individuals participate. They emphasize re-
sponsibility to the social and political networks in which individuals 
are enmeshed because those networks are sources of individual 
freedom along with rights, that distance individuals from the collec-
tivity. Unlike those who hold the self-regarding vision, com-
munitarians do not understand freedom as pre-social, but as 
meaningful only within a social context. Robinson Crusoe was not 
subject to social constraints but neither did he experience human 
freedom. Natty Bumppo was free precisely because of his relation-
ship with the society from which he seemed to be so distant. 
If Natty Bumppo symbolizes the self-regarding vision of the 
American individual, Thomas Jefferson's citizen-farmer symbolizes 
the civic American. The citizen-farmer owns his plot of land not 
just to increase his personal wealth or to satisfy his personal prefer-
ences, but to enable him to fulfill responsibilities that he owes to his 
community, including the uses to which he puts his plot of land. to 
The key civic insight, then, is this: Individuals owe responsibilities 
to others, and not just to their families and friends but more widely 
to their political community, merely by virtue of their membership 
within that community. 
It is important to emphasize that this communitarian vision is 
not merely aspirational, but descriptive. That is, communitarians 
claim that people do in fact act out of a conviction that they are 
9. See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge U. Press, 
1982). 
10. See Alexander, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 5). 
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responsible to social groups and to the community as a whole, in 
addition to acting to improve their own positions in a narrower 
sense. II 
These two visions-self-regarding and communitarian-lead to 
two different and incompatible understandings of the role of prop-
erty rights. These clashing understandings are the basis for the con-
versational dead-end that now largely characterizes American legal 
discourse about the takings issue. 
The self-regarding vision suggests that the role of property 
rights is to serve as a basis for separating the individual from gov-
ernment and from society generally. According to this understand-
ing, individual freedom means freedom from collective coercion. 
Being autonomous means being able to opt out of group relations if 
one objects to a group's actions, to "exit," in the illuminating vocab-
ulary that the economist Albert Hirschman coined several years 
ago. 12 The purpose of all rights, this view continues, is to give indi-
viduals the power to fend off groups, especially the state, and prop-
erty rights are one source of this defensive power. More than that, 
property rights are fundamental rights. As a source of authority, 
they are superior to and take precedence over popular sovereignty. 
Individuals who hold this view of fundamental rights in general, 
whom Bruce Ackerman has recently described as "rights founda-
tionalists,"I3 are not anti-democratic. Rather, they believe that the 
hierarchy of authority that the Constitution creates subordinates 
democracy to certain fundamental rights. Which rights hold this 
privileged position is subject to debate, but those who hold the un-
derstanding of the role of property that I am describing here place 
property rights among the select list. 
The claim that property rights are foundational, which I will 
call the "property rights foundationalist theory," has two versions, 
one strong and the other somewhat weaker. The strong version 
contends that individual property rights are not just a crucial source 
of separation but the preeminent source of individual autonomy in 
our political system. This argument recognizes that political rights, 
including the rights of speech, travel, and privacy, are also impor-
tant in defining the individual in our society as free and self-regard-
ing, but it contends that political rights are not equal in stature to 
property rights. Political rights can and often do conflict with prop-
II. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (Collier 
MacMillan, 1988). 
12. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms. 
Organizations. and States (Harv. U. Press, 1970). 
13. Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations II (Belknap Press, 1991 ). 
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erty rights.I4 To resolve these conflicts, individual rights must be 
ranked hierarchically, and the self-regarding vision considers it es-
sential to attach the highest priority to property rights. 15 Securing 
strong individual property rights is the best way to limit 
government. 
This priority for property rights has been defended on a 
number of bases. James Madison, for example, argued that in a 
democracy property rights are more vulnerable than political 
rights.I6 This asymmetry derives from the inevitably unequal distri-
bution of property, he reasoned. The haves share with the have-
nots a concern for political rights. But the have-nots cannot be ex-
pected to respect property rights. 
The weaker version of the property rights foundationalist the-
ory seeks to establish a parity between property and political rights 
rather than the supremacy of property rights. This version has been 
one of the constant rallying cries of the Right in the past few de-
cades. I? Conservatives have argued for parity rather than 
supremacy because as they see things (with considerable cause), the 
judicial attitude in the post-Lochner era has been strongly tilted in 
favor of the supremacy of political over property rights. Few eco-
nomic regulations are struck down under any of the constitutional 
provisions that appear to protect property and contract. By con-
trast, regulations encroaching on speech interests are highly vulner-
able to judicial review. In the famous Carotene Products footnoteis 
the Court explicitly stated that property rights are an inferior form 
of individual rights, less deserving of constitutional protection that 
political rights. Proponents of the property-as-separation theory 
seek to end this double standard (as they see it), arguing that prop-
erty interests are as vital to safeguarding individual liberty as are 
speech and other non-economic interests. 
14. For a recent example of such a conflict, see Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (held no taking where state law prevents shopping center owners from 
excluding people who are engaged in constitutionally protected speech). 
15. Scholars on both the left and the right have argued that the American constitution 
historically assigned greatest priority to protecting property rights. See Nedelsky, Private 
Property (cited in note 2); Richard Allen Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain (Harv. U. Press, 1985) ("Takings"). 
16. Madison himself did not consider property rights more important than political 
rights. His statement that property "embraces everything to which a man may attach a value 
and have a right" was not intended to reduce all political rights to property rights. Rather, 
his point was that political rights, as rights, have the same character as property rights. See 
Alexander, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 331-32 (cited in note 5). 
17. See, e.g., Richard Funston, The Double Standard of Constitutional Protection in the 
Era of the Welfare State, 90 Pol. Sci. Q. 261 (1975). For a sophisticated critique of this 
argument, see C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Lib-
erty, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1986). 
18. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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It is this self-regarding understanding of property that under-
lies the arguments made in recent years by several commentators, to 
the effect that virtually all land use regulation and other economic 
regulations should be held invalid under the takings clause.I9 These 
commentators view well-established land-use regulations like zon-
ing, not to speak of more exotic forms of regulations like the sort of 
exaction involved in the recent Nollan decision,2o as clear instances 
of exactly what the takings clause was designed to prevent: collec-
tive interference with the private landowner's separate domain. Ac-
cording to this view, the metaphor that best expresses the purpose 
of the takings clause is a boundary2I or wall. The takings clause 
should be thought of as creating a wall between government and 
individual in the use of his land. Just as the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment creates a wall between the government and 
the individual with respect to religious membership, protecting indi-
viduals from state-initiated religious oppression, the takings clause 
makes property a wall that secures individuals from government 
depredations against the material conditions of an individual's life. 
The communitarian vision, in contrast, sees property as a nec-
essary basis for belonging within society and its government. Prop-
erty rights are protected to enable citizens to participate in public 
life, rather than merely to satisfy their private preferences. An obvi-
ous-perhaps the most obvious-aspect of this understanding is the 
relationship that classical republicanism defined between property 
and participation. In its various incarnations, republicanism has 
consistently identified the central role of property as being to endow 
citizens with material well-being sufficient to guarantee indepen-
dence so that they might pursue the common good rather than be-
ing distracted by narrowly self-interested concerns. As Frank 
Michelman has pointed out, this relationship between property and 
participation leads to an emphasis on distribution.22 Republicans 
like John Adams were preoccupied with a concern that an unequal 
distribution of property would undermine the republican polity. 
Citing the seventeenth-century English theorist James Harrington's 
dictum that power always follows property,23 Adams expressed the 
19. See, e.g., Epstein, Takings (cited in note 15); Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights 
and Eminent Domain (Transaction Books, 1987); Bernard H. Siegan, Editor's Introduction: 
The Anomaly of Regulation under the Takings Clause, in Bernard H. Siegan, ed., Planning 
Without Prices: The Takings Clause as It Relates to Land Use Regulation Without Compensa-
tion (D.C. Heath, 1977). 
20. No/lan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
21. For a trenchant critique of the boundary metaphor, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law. 
Boundaries. and the Bounded Self, in 30 Representations 162 (1990). 
22. See Michelman, 72 Iowa L. Rev. at 1327-29 (cited in note 6). 
23. See James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in Maurice Cowling, et a!., 
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need to maintain a balance of property in order to maintain a bal-
ance of power. He stated: 
The only possible way ... of preserving the balance of power on 
the side of equal liberty and public virtue is to make the acquisi-
tion of land easy to every member of society; to make a division 
of the land into small quantities, so that the multitude may be 
possessed of landed estates.24 
The traditional republican relationship between property and par-
ticipation, though, is not the only aspect of the communitarian vi-
sion. Equally if not more important, modern communitarianism 
emphasizes responsibility as a notion that is largely absent from our 
political vocabulary these days. The communitarian ethic stresses 
the importance of responsibility to others as well as to oneself. In-
deed, it considers that personal and civic responsibility are closely 
connected. A sense of civic responsibility-responsibility to others 
and to the polity-grows out of the experience of responsibility to 
oneself. Living a life in which one feels accountable for one's deci-
sions and actions, rather than passing the buck to someone else, 
impresses on one an awareness of one's interrelationships with 
others. Being held accountable for one's actions encourages deliber-
ation about the consequences of those actions on others. A person 
who has developed a robust sense of personal responsibility feels a 
greater sense of moral obligation to others. He feels a deep sense of 
obligation particularly to the communities with which he identifies 
himself. He feels committed to those communities and realizes that 
he affects their well-being. 
How does this understanding of responsibility affect views 
about the role of private ownership of property and the question of 
constitutional protection of property rights? It means that you are 
not free to use your land or other resources in any way you want 
simply because you own it. Indeed, private ownership has never 
been understood to entail complete freedom of use. The common 
law quite early imposed substantial constraints, through the law of 
nuisance, on what landowners could do with their property, and 
these constraints were rooted in the common law judges' recogni-
tion that individual owners owe some responsibility to others 
around them. If you live in a residential neighborhood, for exam-
ple, you owe members of that community the obligation not to in-
terfere substantially with their opportunity to enjoy their property 
eds., The Political Works of James Harrington 157, 163-65 (Cambridge U. Press, 1977); 
James Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular Government, in id. at 394, 404-12. 
24. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in Charles Francis 
Adams, ed., 9 The Works of John Adams 376-77 (Little, Brown, 1854). 
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by putting a factory on your land.2s 
The communitarian understanding of ownership is also re-
flected in the long-standing doctrine that government regulations of 
uses that impose substantial harms on the public do not constitute 
compensable takings.26 It is implicit in the "noxious use" exception 
to regulatory takings analysis, which holds that it is not unfair to 
make an owner whose use substantially threatens some serious in-
jury to the community to which he belongs bear the costs of abating 
the nuisance; as a member of the community, he is responsible to 
them and owes them an obligation not unduly to threaten the qual-
ity of their lives. 
I do not mean to suggest that the communitarian understand-
25. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
26. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this doctrine unanimously in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Industry v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
The Supreme Court's analysis in Keystone left the parameters of this exception ambigu-
ous in a crucial respect. After affirming the public nuisance exception, the Court went on to 
analyze whether the regulation in question produced an impact on the individual owner so 
adverse that the regulation constituted a taking despite its anti-nuisance effect. It is unclear, 
then, whether categorizing regulations as anti-public nuisance means that they cannot be 
compensable takings even if they also fall within one of the tradition categories of regulatory 
takings-permanent physical invasion, deprivation of economic viability, or destruction of 
investment-baked expectations-or whether an anti-public nuisance regulation may still trig-
ger the compensation requirement if it falls within one of those categories. See Michelman, 
Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L. Rev. 1600, 1603-04 n.l9 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist, dis-
senting in Keystone, adopted the latter interpretation. 480 U.S. at 513. 
The Court is likely to resolve this ambiguity this Term when it reviews the decision of 
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 
895 (S.C. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3371 (Nov. 19, 1991). In Lucas, the South Caro-
lina court held that the mandatory setback requirements of the South Carolina Beachfront 
Management Act did not constitute a compensable taking despite the fact that the effect of 
the regulation was completely to deprive the individual owner of two vacant beachfront lots 
of all opportunity to build any permanent structure on his lots other than a small deck or 
walkway. The court reasoned that the regulation fell within the public nuisance-abatement 
category, since the setback requirement was designed to prevent erosion of the beach/dune 
area of South Carolina's coast. It explicitly rejected the owner's argument that by denying 
him "all economically viable use" of his property, the regulation effected a compensable tak-
ing, despite its nuisance-abatement status. The court erroneously assumed that the United 
States Supreme Court in Keystone had concluded that even if they deprive owners of all 
economic viability, regulations that fall within the public nuisance doctrine cannot constitute 
compensable takings. 
What is at stake in Lucas is less whether states will be forced to pay for land that they 
need to protect than the continued viability of environmental program such as South Caro-
lina's Beach Management Plan. Given the severe budgetary restrictions that states face these 
days, it seems highly unlikely that South Carolina could alford to pay for the cost of acquir-
ing beachfront property through eminent domain. At the same time, however, the individual 
landowner has an obvious interest at stake. The communitarian vision recognizes that indi-
vidual owners must sacrifice some measure of freedom to use their property as they wish, but 
it does not require them to commit economic hara-kiri. Even under that vision, it is far from 
clear how the Court should resolve the Hobson's choice that Lucas presents. 
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ing of the takings clause amounts to an expansion of the traditional 
public nuisance doctrine into a general theory for distinguishing be-
tween uncompensable regulations and compensable takings. Frank 
Michelman pointed out nearly twenty-five years ago that classifying 
land-use regulations as compensable or not on the basis of whether 
they prevent harms or extract benefits encounters a "basic diffi-
culty." He articulated that difficulty in this way: "Such a method 
will not work unless we can establish a benchmark of 'neutral' con-
duct which enables us to say where refusal to confer benefits ... 
slips over into readiness to inflict harms."27 Michelman's point is 
that whether a regulatory constraint on land use prevents a harm or 
extracts a benefit all depends on how you look at it. How you look 
at it will be deeply influenced by which of the two visions in the 
dialectic I have described you bring to the question. But although 
neither the public-nuisance test nor any other single test can ever 
serve as a general theory for what governmental actions constitute a 
taking, the public-nuisance test reflects the central communitarian 
insight that property ownership is inevitably social and that the so-
cial context within which property exists is itself the source of re-
sponsibilities, as well as rights, of ownership. 
Let me briefly illustrate the effect of these two visions by apply-
ing them to a form of land-use regulation that has been very contro-
versial in recent years, restrictions on the use and disposition of 
wetlands. The existing state and federal wetlands regulations are 
quite varied and complex, and I am not concerned here with their 
details. My interest rather is connecting the discourse about wet-
lands regulation in general with fundamental images of power and 
core visions of the relationship between property owners and their 
communities. 
More than half of the wetlands in the United States have been 
lost to developmenvs Wetlands are attractive to developers be-
cause they can be purchased cheaply, and when developed for vaca-
tion homes or resorts they are worth a great deal more than the 
acquisition cost. However, once developed, wetlands no longer pro-
vide crucial ecological benefits. Wetlands are natural habitats for 
thousands of organisms; losing wetlands creates a substantial risk of 
damage to the biodiversity that scientists believe is essential to the 
region's ecological health. Wetlands serve other functions as well. 
They filter pollutants, replenish water supplies, and prevent soil ero-
sion. They play a critical role in improving water quality by trap-
27. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1197 (1967). 
28. See Jean Seligmann, What on Earth Is a Wetland?, Newsweek 48 (Aug. 26, 1991 ). 
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ping and filtering sediment, serving as a natural flood control 
system. Some scientists have referred to wetlands as "nature's kid-
neys" because they filter nitrates (produced by nitrogen fertilizers) 
and toxic materials from water before these materials contaminate 
ground water, rivers, bays, and oceans. Wetlands also provide an 
essential habitat for fish and serve as a spawning ground for over 
60% of the nation's commercial fishing catches. 
Agricultural interest groups have for years attacked various 
state and federal wetlands regulations as unduly intrusive of their 
property rights, and recently they succeeded in convincing the Bush 
administration (in particular, Vice President Quayle's Competitive-
ness Council) to propose new federal regulations exempting large 
areas from being classified as wetlands. The debates leading up to 
this decision are revealing because they indicate that the political 
issue of whether wetlands regulations are rational and the legal is-
sue of whether wetlands regulations constitute takings are framed in 
precisely the same terms. The agricultural lobby, led by the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation, stated the political issue in populist 
terms: independent farmer-landowners vs. government regulators.29 
The Farm Bureau, for example, circulated a list of 417 cases of 
"people's lives being devastated" by overly aggressive federal regu-
lators.3o This discourse frames the legal and political issue in the 
same terms; both in politics and in law, the takings question is one 
of power imbalance-powerless individual landowners vs. coercive 
government regulators.3I 
Depicting wetland regulations in this way creates a strong 
emotional and political case for using the takings clause in an ac-
tivist fashion to the redress the power imbalance. The self-regard-
ing vision provides the conceptual foundation for such an activist 
use of the takings clause to check the excesses of powerful govern-
ment regulators. But how accurate is this depiction of the power 
positions of the two sides? Are wetlands regulations the conse-
quence of an imbalance in the distribution of power between owners 
and regulators, in which government regulators have simply over-
whelmed individual farm owners? 
One can tell quite a different story32 about the agriculture 
lobby and wetlands regulation, and this alternative story under-
29. See George Anthan, Farm Groups Dramatize Impact of Wetlands Issue, Ithaca 
Journal 7A (Oct. 15, 1991). 
30. ld. 
31. See Alexander, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1752 (cited in note 6). 
32. On storytelling about property generally, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Story-
telling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 Yale J. L. & 
Hum. 37 (1990). 
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mines the case for using the takings clause in the activist way that 
opponents of wetlands regulations would like. The 1989 federal 
regulations hardly devastated the farming plans of individual farm-
ers. The farm lobby produced scant evidence that the existing re-
strictions prohibited farmers from growing crops on land already in 
production. Nor was much evidence about such consequences 
likely to have been available since the 1989 regulations specifically 
exempted land cropped as of 1985. 
If farmers' plans were devastated at all, it was not their plans 
to cultivate, but their expectations of realizing substantial gains by 
selling farm acreage containing wetlands to real estate developers or 
leasing farm land for oil and gas exploration. Looking past the 
"Farm-Aid" rhetoric that the agriculture lobby deployed against 
the 1989 regulations, the real beneficiaries of the new wetlands regu-
lations are developers and oil and gas firms. As a columnist who 
writes on agricultural issues has noted, "The truth is that more wet-
lands, rather than less, are in agriculture's best interest since wet-
lands help keep nitrates from reaching ground water."JJ 
A more compelling argument why wetlands regulations should 
be compensable is that they single out farmers as the group for car-
rying a disproportionate share of the burden of protecting parts of 
our environment.J4 This argument raises the equal protection as-
pect of takings law. Saul Levmore defines the singling-out phenom-
enon as occurring when "the government's aims could have been 
achieved in many ways but the means chosen place losses on an 
individual or on persons who are not part of an existing or easily 
organized political coalition."Js Persons who are part of a political 
coalition or who can easily form one have a weaker basis for ob-
jecting when regulators place restrictions on them since they can 
protect their interests through politics. 
The takings clause, on this view, functions to protect, through 
the compensation requirement, those persons who cannot easily 
protect their interests through the normal processes of interest-
group politics. This is not the appropriate occasion for discussing 
potential objections to this theory, so let us accept it for present 
purposes. It would be ludicrous to argue that farmers lack the 
means to protect their special interests through the usual political 
process. 
33. See Anthan, Ithaca Journal at 4A (cited in note 29). 
34. On the general problem of singling out, see Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and 
Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285 (1990). 
35. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 1345 
(1991). 
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As the revision of the 1989 federal wetlands regulations indi-
cates, farmers constitute an extremely well-organized and powerful 
lobby which is quite capable of protecting its interests through 
political means. There is no reason to believe that the lobby is any 
less capable of using politics at the state level. Moreover, the coali-
tion opposing wetlands regulations consists of interest groups in ad-
dition to farmers. These interest groups, including real estate 
developers and oil and gas producers, are also highly organized and 
politically powerful. There is no reason, then, to think that wet-
lands regulations were enacted because of the monopoly of the 
political market by one interest group. Nor is there any good rea-
son to consider persons having an economic interest in wetlands as 
singled out by a distorted political process for special burdens. 
At the core of the agricultural lobby's legal-political narrative 
is the self-regarding conception of property ownership. Opponents 
of wetlands regulation depict the regulations as burdening their 
property rights in order to confer an uncompensated benefit on 
other special interest groups, in particular, environmentalists. The 
communitarian account of wetlands regulations emphasizes the 
widespread and long-term public harm that results from loss of wet-
lands. The relativity of harms and benefits means that regulatory 
actions like wetlands regulations can just as easily be interpreted as 
preventing substantial public harms as construed in the benefit-
extracting story that regulatory opponents tell. Which story one 
tells depends on the normative theory of responsibility to the com-
munity one applies. Communitarian theory, in describing wetlands 
regulations as a matter of preventing long-term and widespread 
public damage, rests on a normative understanding of ownership as 
entailing wider responsibilities to others than merely avoiding im-
mediate harms of the sort that would be actionable as trespass or 
common-law nuisance. 
It is appropriate to ask, then, how the communitarian vision 
can be reconciled with the takings clause. Does that vision lead to 
the conclusion that there is no role for the takings clause to play, 
that the state should be free to appropriate resources without pay-
ing compensation so long as some public-minded justification for 
the appropriation can be provided? The basic communitarian 
premise is that justice does not always require that the state com-
pensate an owner for property it has taken from him. This point 
was effectively made more than half a century ago by Morris 
Cohen, who stated, "[W]hile this [state compensation for taking an 
owner's property] is generally advisable in order not to disturb the 
general feeling of security, no absolute principle of justice requires 
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it."36 
The distribution of property is established by the state, not by 
appropriations from a state of nature. This does not morally entitle 
the state to redistribute as it wishes, but it does indicate that any 
moral obligation to compensate does not exist merely by asserting 
some pre-political right to property. Private ownership is not only 
state-created but also conditional. Individual owners are not free to 
do whatever they wish with or to their property. They owe certain 
responsibilities to the communities to which they belong, and these 
civic responsibilities condition individual freedom of ownership. 
At the same time, it is equally important to emphasize what it 
implicit in the first half of Cohen's statement, that the communi tar-
ian vision does not represent a dissolution of the line between public 
and private ownership. Communitarianism should not be under-
stood as abandoning a commitment to individual property rights. 
The subordination of property rights to human rights is a mark of a 
society's progress, but it is equally true that the replacement of 
property rights with centralized control over the material condi-
tions of existence is the mark of social regress. 
A central purpose of property that the civic and non-civic tra-
ditions alike recognize is respecting the individual's sense of dignity. 
The testimony of the recently liberated citizens of east-central Eu-
rope confirms the importance of property rights for individual dig-
nity. Our own personal experiences confirm the need for 
individuals to feel that they control the concrete, immediate condi-
tions of their existence. A second and, from the perspective of the 
civic understanding, at least equally important purpose of individ-
ual ownership is its role in developing a individual's sense of per-
sonal responsibility. The civic vision regards individual property 
ownership as one of the fundamental social institutions by which 
individuals develop a sense of responsibility both to themselves and 
to the communities of which they are a part. 
The responsibility function of property overlaps substantially 
with the dignity rationale. Both a sense of responsibility and a sense 
of dignity depend upon individuals having the power to make deci-
sions over matters that affect the immediate circumstances of their 
lives. From the civic point of view, state socialism is offensive pre-
cisely because, contrary to its rationale, it stunts the individual's 
sense of responsibility to the community. It renders citizens passive 
and powerless. Classical liberal ownership enables individuals to 
develop a sense of responsibility by vesting final accountability for 
36. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L. Q. 8, 24 (1927). 
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their actions in themselves rather than in some faceless 
bureaucracy .37 
If the takings clause continues to be a vital source of constitu-
tional protection under the civic vision, but not to implement the 
self-regarding vision, what scope should it have? To begin with, the 
takings clause is a collective precommitment device. It is a limita-
tion on democratic power that is necessary because majorities have 
incentives to sacrifice long-term to short-term objectives. As the 
Founders realized and emphasized, the threat of destabilizing or ill-
considered expropriations of property isn't confined to monarchies 
but exists in democracies as well. Jon Elster explains the point: 
If all issues were subject to simple majority voting, society would 
lack stability and predictability. A small majority might easily 
be reversed, by accidents of participation or by a few individuals 
changing their minds. More important, if the majority followed 
short-lived passions or short-term expediency, it might act rashly 
and override individual rights granted by earlier decisions.Js 
The takings clause adds a degree of stability that would otherwise 
be absent if the state were free to appropriate property as it wished 
without compensating the owner. The prohibition against uncom-
pensated takings for public use enables the polity to maximize its 
welfare over the long run by making it difficult to take steps that are 
expedient in the short-term. 
Preventing majorities from ill-considered actions against prop-
erty owners does not require immunity from governmental actions. 
The takings clause implicitly acknowledges that private ownership 
of property is not absolute vis-a-vis the government; the public use 
and compensation requirements protect individual owners against 
government actions more weakly. In the terminology that Cala-
bresi and Melamed coined,39 the Constitution protects private prop-
erty against government actions through a liability rather than a 
property rule, that is, through a rule that permits a forced sale to 
the government. By making legislators put their money where their 
mouths are, the public use and compensation requirements force 
legislators to act responsibly in appropriating private property, but 
37. This attribute holds for the classical liberal form of ownership but not for all forms 
of private ownership. The rise of the corporate form of ownership, with its characteristic 
separation of ownership and control, in this sense represents a regressive form of privatiza-
tion. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pension and Passivity: Fiduciary Law and the Limitations of 
Pension-Fund Socialism,- L. & Contemp. Prob.- (forthcoming 1992). 
38. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality 196 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1989). 
39. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
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do not entirely prevent government from appropriating private 
property. Of course, none of this indicates just exactly which gov-
ernment actions that detrimentally affect private property trigger 
the compensation requirement. The line between government regu-
lations that are legitimate because they fall within an owner's re-
sponsibility to the communities to which he belongs and those that 
fall outside that realm and thereby interfere with his sense of dignity 
is contestable and controversial. The important point is to empha-
size that some measure of restriction on individual use and enjoy-
ment exists as a consequence of civic responsibility. 
I suggested earlier that the civic understanding is partly ex-
pressed in the traditional noxious-use test for distinguishing permis-
sible regulations from impermissible takings. The idea of 
responsibility to the polity goes beyond that relatively narrow idea, 
however. The broader idea is that the polity cedes a measure of 
authority to individuals as property owners not only for them to 
satisfy their own wants but also to promote the community's wel-
fare, and in ceding that authority to the individual, it expects that 
the individual will at times subordinate the pursuit of his wants for 
a community welfare interest that is particularly acute or compel-
ling, that is, more than the sort of interest required to satisfy the 
minimal rationality requirement for exercises of the police power.40 
In light of this expectation-a condition on all ownership inter-
ests-it is not unjust or unfair for the polity to impose some limits 
on an individual's freedom to use or enjoy his property in some way 
in the interest of an important collective interest that the polity has 
identified after deliberate public discussion. The civic responsibility 
theory explains, for example, why welfare programs, which are ob-
viously redistributive, are not usually considered to constitute un-
constitutional takings. The wealthier members of the community 
owe a responsibility to alleviate the abject poverty that other mem-
40. This distinction is necessary to avoid the problem that confronts the rationale that 
Justice Brennan introduced in footnote 43 of his majority opinion in the Penn Central case. 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Referring to nox-
ious-use cases (Hadacheck, Miller v. Shoene, and Goldblatt v. Hempstead), Justice Brennan 
stated that these cases "are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious' quality 
of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related 
to the implementation of a policy ... expected to produce a widespread public benefit and 
applicable to all similarly situated property." 438 U.S. at 134 n.30. As stated, Justice Bren-
nan's test hardly serves itself as an adequate justification for why certain land-use regulations 
enacted through the exercise of the police power do not trigger the takings clause's compensa-
tion requirement. To be a valid exercise of the police power, the regulation must be reason-
ably related to a legitimate governmental objective such as health or safety. As James Krier 
points out, only by resorting to some concept like noxiousness can non-compensatory public 
land-use restrictions be distinguished from restrictions that are compensatory. See James E. 
Krier, The Regulation Machine, I Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. I, 7 (1982). 
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bers of the community experience because the community has ena-
bled them to own their wealth.4I 
The civic vision can be seen as related to another traditional 
takings test as well. The "reciprocity" test provides that a regula-
tion restricting a property owner's advantage is not an unconstitu-
tional taking if it simultaneously confers roughly reciprocal benefits 
on the affected owner.42 Similarly, the civic vision holds that an 
owner who apparently loses as a result of a governmental program 
may in fact be a winner, sufficiently so that additional compensation 
is not required. This will be the case, for example, when a govern-
ment regulation prevents an owner from using his property in a way 
that benefits him in the short run but actually makes him worse off 
in the long run. 
There is no a priori basis for determining the precise scope of 
an owner's responsibilities to his communities under the civic vi-
sion. The problem is not simply that so many factors are involved 
but that the scope of the responsibility concept itself is politically 
and morally contestable. The practical judgment required to re-
solve these political and moral conflicts is intensely context-
dependent. To prejudge the extent to which the community respon-
sibilities of private ownership relieve the state from compensating 
owners for actions taken with respect to their property would cut 
off deliberative discussion, both within the political process and in 
takings adjudication. Takings law is now largely characterized by 
such context-specific adjudication, although critics continue to de-
cry its detrimental effects on process values such as predictability.43 
It matters a great deal how these two visions are mediated. 
The objective ought to be mediating the conflicts in a way that ac-
41. In a very illuminating essay Carol Rose has recently described a similar understand-
ing, which she calls "property-as-propriety." This understanding is closely linked with the 
idea that individuals own property in trust for the larger community. See Carol M. Rose, 
Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in John W. Chapman, ed., Nomos XXXIII.· Com· 
pensatory Justice 223, 237-40 (N.Y.U. Press, 1991). 
This idea also resembles the theory that Judge Breitel developed in his opinion for the 
New York Court of Appeals in the Penn Central case, the "social increment" theory. See 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). According to this theory, which derives from Henry George's "single 
tax" thesis (see Henry George, Progress and Poverty (1878)), Grand Central Terminal's rate 
of return should be discounted by the increment of the building's value attributable to public 
contributions, by way of subsidies, franchises, tax exemption, and other governmental bene-
fits, and related community growth. The insight is, as Judge Breitel expressed it, that "soci-
ety is [entitled] to receive its due for its share in the making of a once great railroad." 42 
N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919. The civic vision extends that 
insight on the ground that the polity effectively enables the private ownership of all property. 
42. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
43. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 
Colum. L. Rev. 1697 (1988). 
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knowledges that neither vision is privileged. Such a method must, 
in other words, be as open and democratic as possible. A formal 
takings methodology of the kind urged by several commentators re-
cently« is ill-suited to the open kind of process that I have in mind. 
As a judicial technique, ad hoc balancing is the only way to assure 
that the dialectic is not closed by one vision preempting the other 
through some formal rule that effectively codifies it. Formality is 
not neutral between these two substantive visions.4s A formal tak-
ings approach is very apt to enshrine the self-regarding vision rather 
than the civic vision. 
Although recent Supreme Court decisions hint at a growing 
sense of restiveness toward balancing,46 we should not expect any 
wholesale shift toward greater formality in takings adjudication. 
While the Court's ideology is probably more favorably tilted toward 
property rights and the self-regarding vision today than it has been 
since the beginning of this century, the Court has also recently reaf-
firmed its conviction that the constitutional validity of regulations 
under the takings clause is context-dependent.47 Moreover, some 
members of the Court have reaffirmed the continued presence of the 
civic vision despite the recrudescence of the self-regarding vision, 
acknowledging, for example, that alleviating the hardship of tenants 
through price regulation of rent is a legitimate legislative policy and 
does not generally trigger the compensation requirement.4s It 
seems highly unlikely, then, that the post-modern dialectic will dis-
appear from the Court's takings rhetoric. 
44. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is 
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 (1988); Rose-Ackerman, 88 Colum. L. 
Rev. at 1697 (cited in note 43). 
45. For a similar argument, see Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the 
Constitutional Idea of Propeny, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1321, 1321 n.10 (1987). 
46. See Frank I. Michelman, Takings. 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1988). 
47. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I (1988). 
48. ld. 
